Uzbekistan, a lower middle-income economy in Central and West Asia with a population of 36.4 million and a GDP (PPP) of $431.9 billion in 2024, confronts a persistent air pollution challenge linked to its transport sector. While the annual average concentration of PM 2.5 has declined from 37.0 micrograms per cubic meter in 2000 to 32.8 in 2023, this level still exceeds both the WHO air quality guideline of 5 micrograms per cubic meter and the interim target of 25 micrograms per cubic meter. The country's performance marginally exceeds the Central and West Asia regional average of 30.4 in 2022, yet remains far from safe thresholds. Transport's contribution to this burden is substantial: the State of Global Air estimates that transport and international shipping contributed approximately 5.0% and 0.3% to ambient PM 2.5 in 2019, respectively. This exposure pattern reflects deeper urban planning challenges, with the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy estimating that 70% of Uzbekistan's urban population live beyond 500 meters from highways.

The human cost of air pollution in Uzbekistan is severe. The World Bank estimates that 26,749 people died prematurely due to exposure to ambient PM 2.5 in 2019. McDuffie et al. (2021) attribute about 1,367 of these premature deaths directly to transport tailpipe emissions. Occupational exposure adds another dimension to this health crisis: in 2023, at least 44 people died prematurely from exposure to diesel engine exhausts, equivalent to roughly 1 death per million population. The economic toll is staggering. The World Bank estimated that health damages from ambient and household PM 2.5 exposure cost Uzbekistan 17.9 billion USD in 2019, representing about 7% of GDP. This burden approaches the country's total healthcare expenditure, which stood at 7.4% of GDP in 2022. In regional context, Asia-Pacific's air pollution health costs averaged 10.6% of GDP, suggesting Uzbekistan performs relatively better but still faces enormous losses.

Uzbekistan's economic growth has not decoupled from transport emissions growth. Since 2010, GDP has expanded by 7.2% annually, while PM 2.5 emissions from transport declined by 3.3% between 2000-2010 but then grew by 2.8% between 2010-2022. This reversal signals that earlier emission control efforts have stalled or been overwhelmed by growing transport activity. By 2022, the transport sector accounted for 13% of total PM 2.5 emissions in Uzbekistan. Road transport dominates this picture, responsible for 92% of transport PM 2.5 emissions by 2022, up from 85% in 2010. Rail contributes 8%, while domestic navigation and aviation each contribute 0%. Within the road sector, heavy duty vehicles are the primary culprit: IIASA estimates they generate 63% of PM 2.5 emissions in 2025, with light duty vehicles contributing 27%, buses 9%, and motorcycles negligible amounts. A troubling trend is the rising share of non-exhaust emissions—resuspended dust, brake wear, and tire wear—which increased from 22% of road sector emissions in 2010 to 39% by 2022.

Transport's contribution to nitrogen oxides (NOx) is even more pronounced. NOx emissions from transport declined by 3.1% between 2000-2010 but grew by 1.8% between 2010-2022, while emissions from other sectors grew by just 0.7% annually over the latter period. By 2022, transport was responsible for 38% of total NOx emissions in Uzbekistan. Road transport accounted for 93% of transport NOx emissions in 2022, up from 87% in 2010, with rail contributing 7% and navigation and aviation each contributing 0%. Unlike PM 2.5, light duty vehicles dominate road sector NOx emissions, producing 67% in 2025 according to IIASA estimates, compared to 26% from heavy duty vehicles, 6% from buses, and negligible amounts from motorcycles. For sulfur oxides (SOx), transport plays a minor role—just 1% of total emissions by 2022—but trends reveal modal shifts within the sector. SOx emissions from transport declined by 7.0% between 2000-2010 and by 5.2% between 2010-2022, even as other sectors grew emissions by 4.3% annually. Road transport's share of transport SOx emissions increased from 60% in 2010 to 68% by 2022, with rail contributing 31% and aviation 1%.

CH4 emissions from transport declined by 1.4% between 2000-2010 but surged by 8.7% between 2010-2022, with 100% originating from the road sector by 2022. NMVOC emissions declined by 2.7% between 2000-2010 and grew by 2.3% between 2010-2022, with 99% from road transport by 2022. Black carbon (BC) emissions, critical for both air quality and climate, declined by 3.9% between 2000-2010 but grew by 1.1% between 2010-2022. Road transport contributed 95% of transport BC emissions in 2022, up from 93% in 2010, with rail accounting for 5% and navigation and aviation contributing 0% each.

Uzbekistan's transport energy landscape reveals a sector dominated by roads and increasingly dependent on natural gas. In 2023, the road sector consumed about 98% of total transport energy, with rail, domestic navigation, and domestic aviation contributing 2%, 0%, and 0%, respectively. The fuel mix has undergone a dramatic transformation: oil products' share of transport energy consumption plummeted from 97% in 2010 to 63% in 2015 and further to 43% by 2023. This shift primarily reflects substitution by natural gas rather than clean energy alternatives. Biofuels and electricity constituted just 0% and 1% of transport energy consumption in 2023, respectively. The rail sector shows modest electrification progress, with electricity's share increasing from about 20% in 2010 to approximately 38% by 2023. These figures underscore that Uzbekistan's transport sector remains overwhelmingly fossil fuel-dependent, with minimal penetration of renewable or zero-emission technologies.

Fossil fuel subsidies continue to distort Uzbekistan's transport sector, imposing hidden costs that extend beyond direct fiscal outlays. Between 2010 and 2015, fossil fuel subsidies in transport averaged about 1.9 billion USD annually, rising to 3.1 billion USD annually between 2016 and 2023. These subsidies generate additional external costs, with 23% manifesting as increased local air pollution. This policy creates a perverse incentive structure that encourages fuel consumption and undermines investments in cleaner alternatives. Fuel tax revenues, meanwhile, comprise approximately 2% of Uzbekistan's total government revenue and face structural decline as transport electrification progresses. This revenue vulnerability presents both a fiscal risk and an opportunity: reforming fuel subsidies could simultaneously improve air quality, reduce health costs, and create fiscal space for sustainable transport investments.

Uzbekistan has witnessed rapid growth in electric vehicle (EV) imports, though starting from a low base. The value of EV imports reached 2.0 billion USD between 2017 and 2024, representing 28% of total road vehicle imports by 2024. Light duty vehicles comprise 91% of these EV imports, with goods vehicles and buses accounting for 5%, and two-wheelers contributing 4%. UNEP's E-mobility Readiness Index assigns Uzbekistan a score of 79 out of 100, with component scores of 17 in technology and market, 20 in policy, 20 in energy, and 22 in financial instruments. These scores suggest moderate readiness across dimensions but highlight gaps in market maturity and supportive policy frameworks. Motorization levels provide context for EV deployment potential: Uzbekistan had 209 vehicles per thousand population in 2024, up from 186 in 2000, but still below the Asia-Pacific average of 317 in 2024. This relatively lower motorization rate presents an opportunity to leapfrog to cleaner technologies before locking in fossil fuel dependency.

Public transport infrastructure in Uzbekistan remains inadequate, contributing to the dominance of private vehicles and resulting emissions. In 2015, Uzbekistan had 2.3 kilometers of rapid transit per million urban population, modestly increasing to 2.8 kilometers by 2024. This limited expansion has failed to keep pace with urbanization and motorization. Access to convenient public transport is alarmingly poor: among 23 urban agglomerations in Uzbekistan, only 4% achieved an access level of 50% or better, meaning that in most cities, half or fewer residents live within 500 meters of public transport. In 87% of cities, eight out of ten residents lack convenient access to public transport. This infrastructure deficit forces residents toward private vehicle use, exacerbating road congestion, fuel consumption, and air pollution. Without substantial investment in public transport networks and first-and-last-mile connectivity, Uzbekistan's transport emissions trajectory will remain upward despite modest gains in vehicle technology and fuel quality.

EV in public transport

EV mandates/ procurement

Railway electrification

Vehicle air pollution emission standards

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