Kazakhstan, an upper middle-income economy in the Central and West Asia region with a population of 20.6 million and a GDP (PPP) of $840.4 billion in 2024, faces mounting challenges from transport-related air pollution. The country's GDP per capita of $40,813 reflects relatively strong economic performance, yet this prosperity has come with environmental costs that demand urgent attention.
The annual average concentration of PM 2.5 in Kazakhstan has deteriorated over the past two decades, rising from 17.3 micrograms per cubic meter in 2000 to 19.6 micrograms per cubic meter in 2023. While this figure remains below the WHO interim target of 25 micrograms per cubic meter, it substantially exceeds the WHO air quality guideline of 5 micrograms per cubic meter. Notably, Kazakhstan's levels are lower than the Central and West Asia regional average of 30.4 micrograms per cubic meter recorded in 2022. The State of Global Air estimates that transport and international shipping contributed approximately 5.3 percent and 0.3 percent to ambient PM 2.5 concentrations respectively in 2019. Compounding this exposure risk, the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy found that only 63 percent of Kazakhstan's urban population resides beyond 500 meters from highways, suggesting significant portions of the urban population face heightened exposure to traffic-related pollutants.
The health impacts of ambient air pollution in Kazakhstan are substantial and measurable. The World Bank estimates that 10,133 people died prematurely due to exposure to ambient PM 2.5 in 2019. McDuffie and colleagues further estimated that approximately 550 of these premature deaths could be directly attributed to transport tailpipe emissions. In 2023 alone, at least 54 people died prematurely from occupational exposure to diesel engine exhausts, equivalent to roughly 3 deaths per million population. These mortality figures translate into staggering economic costs—the World Bank estimated that health damages from ambient and household PM 2.5 exposure amounted to $33.9 billion in 2019, representing approximately 7 percent of GDP. While this burden is substantial, it compares favorably to the Asia-Pacific average of 10.6 percent of GDP. For perspective, Kazakhstan allocated only 3.7 percent of GDP to healthcare in 2022, underscoring the disproportionate economic toll of air pollution relative to health system investments.
Kazakhstan's transport sector emissions profile has evolved dramatically over recent decades, driven by economic growth and changing mobility patterns. Since 2010, Kazakhstan's GDP has grown at an impressive 7.2 percent annually. However, PM 2.5 emissions from the transport sector, which grew modestly by 0.4 percent between 2000 and 2010, accelerated sharply to 5.9 percent annual growth between 2010 and 2022. This contrasts with emissions from other sectors, which have been declining by 0.5 percent per year since 2010. By 2022, the transport sector accounted for 3 percent of total PM 2.5 emissions in Kazakhstan. The modal composition reveals a striking dominance of road transport, which comprised 100 percent of transport PM 2.5 emissions by 2022, increasing from 74 percent in 2010. Rail, domestic navigation, and domestic aviation contributed zero percent by 2022, with domestic navigation's share declining from 6 percent in 2010 to zero by 2022.
Within the road sector itself, heavy-duty vehicles bear primary responsibility for PM 2.5 emissions. IIASA estimates that in 2025, heavy-duty vehicles will account for 69 percent of PM 2.5 emissions in Kazakhstan's road sector, followed by light-duty vehicles at 20 percent, buses at 11 percent, and motorcycles at effectively zero percent. Importantly, non-exhaust emissions from resuspended dust, brake wear, and tire wear contributed 37 percent of road sector PM 2.5 emissions by 2022, a slight decrease from 40 percent in 2010, indicating that exhaust controls alone cannot fully address particulate matter pollution.
Nitrogen oxide emissions from Kazakhstan's transport sector followed a similar trajectory to PM 2.5, growing 0.3 percent annually between 2000 and 2010 before accelerating to 3.3 percent annual growth between 2010 and 2022. NOx emissions from non-transport sectors declined by 0.7 percent per year over the same period. By 2022, transport accounted for 25 percent of Kazakhstan's total NOx emissions. Road transport dominated with 99 percent of transport NOx emissions in 2022, up from 88 percent in 2010, while rail contributed 1 percent and domestic navigation and aviation effectively zero percent. IIASA projects that in 2025, light-duty vehicles will generate 54 percent of road sector NOx emissions, heavy-duty vehicles 38 percent, buses 7 percent, and motorcycles less than 1 percent—a distribution markedly different from PM 2.5 emissions and reflecting the higher relative NOx output from light-duty vehicles.
Sulfur oxide emissions from transport tell a more nuanced story. SOx emissions grew 2.1 percent annually between 2000 and 2010 but subsequently declined by 4.3 percent per year between 2010 and 2022, likely reflecting fuel quality improvements and reduced sulfur content in diesel and other transport fuels. Despite this decline, emissions from other sectors grew by 1.0 percent annually over the same period. By 2022, transport accounted for less than 1 percent of total SOx emissions in Kazakhstan. Within the transport sector, road transport comprised 85 percent of SOx emissions in 2022, up from 54 percent in 2010, while rail contributed 15 percent and domestic navigation's share fell from 35 percent in 2010 to zero by 2022.
Methane emissions from transport grew at relatively consistent rates of 1.8 percent annually between 2000 and 2010 and 1.7 percent between 2010 and 2022. By 2022, road transport accounted for 97 percent of transport-related methane emissions. Non-methane volatile organic compounds followed a steeper growth trajectory, increasing 1.0 percent annually from 2000 to 2010 and accelerating to 3.8 percent between 2010 and 2022, with 100 percent originating from the road sector by 2022.
Black carbon emissions merit particular attention given their dual impact on climate and human health. BC emissions from transport grew 0.6 percent annually between 2000 and 2010 before surging to 7.3 percent annual growth between 2010 and 2022—the highest growth rate among all measured pollutants. By 2022, road transport, including non-exhaust sources, generated 100 percent of transport BC emissions, up from 83 percent in 2010, while domestic navigation's contribution fell from 4 percent to zero over the same period.
Kazakhstan's transport sector remains overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum products. In 2023, the road sector consumed approximately 82 percent of total transport energy, while rail accounted for 14 percent, domestic aviation 4 percent, and domestic navigation effectively zero percent. Oil products constituted 98 percent of transport sector energy consumption in 2023, a marginal decrease from 99 percent in 2010 and a slight increase from 95 percent in 2015. Biofuels and electricity represented less than 1 percent and 2 percent of transport energy consumption respectively in 2023, indicating minimal progress toward fuel diversification.
Within the rail sector, electricity consumption declined from approximately 22 percent in 2010 to about 15 percent by 2023, suggesting increased diesel traction or reduced electrified rail operations. Kazakhstan's grid emission factor stood at 802 grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour in 2024, substantially higher than the Asia-Pacific average of 559 and the Central and West Asia average of 495. The country's grid decarbonization progress has been modest, improving by only 0.5 percent annually since 2015, compared to 1.4 percent per year for Asia-Pacific overall. This carbon-intensive electricity grid limits the immediate climate benefits of transport electrification efforts.
Fossil fuel subsidies in Kazakhstan's transport sector increased dramatically from approximately $5.8 billion between 2010 and 2015 to $17.4 billion between 2016 and 2023. These subsidies impose additional external costs on society, with 38 percent manifesting as increased local air pollution—a concerning finding that suggests current policies inadvertently exacerbate public health challenges while constraining fiscal resources for cleaner transport investments.
Electric vehicle imports to Kazakhstan reached $305 million between 2017 and 2024, representing 4 percent of total road vehicle imports by 2024. The composition of EV imports reveals 59 percent light-duty vehicles, 40 percent two-wheelers, and 1 percent goods vehicles and buses—a distribution suggesting consumer-driven adoption rather than strategic fleet electrification. UNEP's E-mobility Readiness Index assigned Kazakhstan a score of 59 out of 100, with component scores of 17 for technology and market, 5 for policy, 21 for energy infrastructure, and 16 for financial instruments. This assessment indicates significant structural barriers to accelerated EV adoption, particularly in policy frameworks and financial mechanisms.
Motorization rates in Kazakhstan stood at 245 vehicles per thousand population in 2024, compared to 257 in 2000 and below the Asia-Pacific average of 317 in 2024. This suggests vehicle ownership has remained relatively stable despite economic growth, though it masks important dynamics in fleet composition, utilization patterns, and modal distribution.
Kazakhstan's public transport infrastructure development has been limited. In 2015, the country had 0.7 kilometers of rapid transit per million urban population, which increased to 3.0 kilometers by 2024—progress, but still far below levels in comparable middle-income countries. More concerning, among the 25 urban agglomerations in Kazakhstan, 72 percent of cities fail to provide convenient public transport access to 8 out of 10 residents. This lack of viable public transport alternatives effectively locks residents into private vehicle dependency, perpetuating the emissions growth trends observed across all pollutant categories.
The confluence of these factors—accelerating transport emissions growth, limited public transport alternatives, heavy dependence on fossil fuels, modest electrification progress, and substantial fossil fuel subsidies—suggests Kazakhstan faces a critical juncture in managing transport air pollution. Without decisive policy interventions to shift mobility patterns, accelerate vehicle technology transitions, and develop sustainable transport infrastructure, the health and economic burdens of transport air pollution will likely continue escalating alongside economic growth.
| Concept for transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Green Economy | Not Found | SOX, NOX emissions into environment = European levels of emissions | 2030 |
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